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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that in recessions the rate of workplace accidents goes down.
This paper presents a theory and an empirical investigation to explain this phenomenon.
The theory is based on the idea that reporting an accident dents the reputation of a
worker and raises the probability that he is fired. If the unemployment rate is high,
a worker faces a big loss when fired and fewer workplace accidents are reported. The
empirical investigation concerns workplace accidents in 16 OECD countries. We conclude
that cyclical fluctuations in workplace accident rates have to do with reporting behavior
of workers and not with changes in workplace safety.
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1 Introduction
Workplace accident rates are procyclical, which could indicate that workplace safety increases
in recessions. If so, this would be in line with evidence presented by Ruhm (2000) indicating
that booms are unhealthy. Ruhm finds a strong relationship between macroeconomic conditions
and mortality, which he attributes to hazardous working conditions, the physical exertion of
employment, and job-related stress when job hours are extended during short-lasting economic
expansions.1 This explanation for the procyclicality of workplace accident rates has to do with
working conditions and concerns workplace safety. In booms the effort level of workers is higher.
When employers require high effort levels from their workers, these workers become less careful.
Hence the rate of workplace accidents increases. When workers exert less effort, they can take
more care and are therefore involved in less accidents. If effort is procyclical, so is the rate of
workplace accidents. Consequently, the workplace accident rate is negatively correlated with
the unemployment rate. Also in booms more workers are hired than in slumps. If newly hired
workers are less experienced and are therefore more likely to be involved in workplace accidents
there is an additional explanation a higher accident rate in a boom.
The change in workplace safety is not the only explanation for the cyclicality in workplace
accident rates. An alternative explanation is related to the well-known procyclical variation in
workers’ absenteeism. If unemployment is high, workers fear to loose their job, so conditional on
a specific state of their health they are less inclined to stay away from work. If unemployment
is low, employers will be more reluctant to fire a worker even in case of frequent absenteeism.
So, absence-prone workers are more likely to be dismissed in an economic downturn (Leigh
(1985)).
In terms of workplace accidents the idea is that workers are reluctant to report these acci-
dents because they fear (correctly or incorrectly) that employers will hold this against them.2
1 Ruhm (2000) investigates the relationship between economic conditions and health, using U.S. state specific
data. Other possible reasons for the relationship mentioned are that higher employment rates are associated
with increases in smoking and obesity, reduced physical activity, and worse diets. Also, the higher incomes
associated with good economic times may lead to increases in some risky activities. Ruhm (2001) finds that
there is countercyclical variation in physical health while there is some evidence that mental health is procyclical.
2OECD (1989) notes that among social and psychological factors which influence workplace accidents statis-
tics that “workers may not report injuries because they fear loss of attendance bonuses, or other personal
disadvantages, such as becoming prime candidates for redundancy”.
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In particular, we assume that workers think that if the firm has to lay off some workers at some
future date (say, because of a labor saving innovation or because demand for the industry’s
products goes down) it will tend to fire workers that have reported accidents in the past. When
unemployment is low, being fired does not involve a big loss because it is relatively easy to find
a new job. Hence workers are more likely to report an accident when unemployment is low.
In contrast, a high unemployment rate makes it harder for a fired worker to find a new job
and hence a worker is less likely to report an accident. So we expect that the reporting rate of
accidents is low if the unemployment rate is high.
For concreteness, consider the following example. A worker in a factory caries a heavy
object. He stumbles and almost drops the object which causes him to strain his back. If the
back pain is so severe that he cannot continue to work, he has no choice but to report the
accident. He can then go home to recover for a couple of days. If the worker can continue
work but the back pain is rather uncomfortable he decides whether to inform his employer or
not. Our conjecture is that he is more likely to report the accident if the unemployment rate
is low. If his employer would use the accident against him, in the sense that it becomes more
likely that he will be fired if the firm needs to shed labor, at least the consequences are not too
severe. Similarly, a secretary who feels her fingers tingling faces the choice of stopping to work
and go home or continuing and raise the risk of a mouse arm. Our conjecture, again, is that
she will continue to work if the unemployment rate is high, until it becomes clear that she does
have a problem with her arm and needs rest.
This paper focuses on the question whether a high workplace accident rate in a boom is a true
workplace safety phenomenon related to stress or inexperienced workers and thus an indication
of workers’ health being harmed in prosperous times or whether alternatively a high workplace
accident rate in a boom is a spurious phenomenon caused by changes in workers reporting
behavior. The two explanations for the cyclicality of workplace accidents are tested empirically.
Part of the evidence presented uses the distinction between non-fatal and fatal accidents (see the
appendix for more details). The workplace safety explanation predicts that the unemployment
rate has a negative effect on workplace accidents. Furthermore, it predicts that working hours
have a positive effect on workplace accidents because working longer increases the probability
of an accident. This can happen for two reasons. First, working more hours may make workers
tired and fatigue raises the probability of injury per hour (or per task). Second, even if the
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injury rate per hour (or task) is unchanged, working more hours increases the workers’ exposure
to this risk of accidents at work. This raises the accident rate (per worker). Also, the change
in the employment rate is positively related to the workplace accident rate since an increase
in employment coincides with a lot of new hirings while a decrease in employment is related
to few new hirings. New hirings tend to be less experienced and hence more prone to have or
cause an accident. If workplace safety is the driving force not only the non-fatal accident rate
but also the fatal accident rate will exhibit cyclicality. The ‘reporting’ explanation predicts
that the unemployment rate is negatively related to the non-fatal workplace accident rate but
not to the fatal accident rate because fatal accidents are always reported (if there is a reporting
decision at all in this case). Further, as unemployment benefits go up one should expect a
smaller effect of the unemployment rate on the non-fatal accident rate.
In our empirical analysis it appears that the unemployment rate is negatively related to
the workplace accident rate while working hours and the change in the employment rate have
no effect on the workplace accident rate. Furthermore, cyclicality is found only for non-fatal
workplace accidents. From this evidence and additional sensitivity analyses we conclude that
the procyclical behavior of workplace accidents is most likely related to reporting rates and
not to actual fluctuations in accidents. From a policy perspective this result implies that
when in cyclical upturns the workplace accidents rate goes up there is no urgent need to start
worrying about workplace safety nor to start a work safety campaign. Instead, in times of high
unemployment safety auditors should encourage people to report (minor) accidents.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 2 we set the stage by giving an overview of
previous studies on absenteeism and workplace accidents. In Section 3 we present a theoretical
model that explains the cyclicality in reported workplace accidents. Section 4 describes the data
on workplace accidents from 16 OECD countries, discusses the statistical model and presents
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous studies
There are several studies that investigate the cyclicality of workplace absenteeism. According
to Barmby et al. (1994) the effect of absence behavior on the probability of being fired may
act as a worker discipline device. Brown and Sessions (1996) distinguishes between absence
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that occurs for valid (i.e. ‘sickness’) and invalid (i.e. ‘shirking’) reasons. According to them
little attention has been paid in the economic literature to either the causes or the effects of
absenteeism. They analyze absence within the framework of the static neoclassical labor supply
model in which a worker has an incentive to absent himself if the level of contractual hours
specified by the employer exceeds his desired hours. According to Johansson and Palme (1996)
when unemployment increases, shirking or absenteeism decreases. They use a 1981 Swedish
micro dataset to investigate the relationship between work absence and county-specific annual
average unemployment rates. They find a negative relationship. Johansson and Palme (2002)
presents an analysis of panel data showing a declining work absence of Swedish blue-collar
workers during a period in which there was a major reform in the income replacement program
for short-term sickness and income taxes. It turns out that the cost of being absent significantly
affects work absence behavior. The increased cost, rather than the higher unemployment rate,
caused the decrease in the work absence rate. According to Arai and Thoursie (2005) pro-
cyclical absenteeism might be due to higher sick-rates of marginal workers, or a consequence
of procyclical sick-report incentives. They use Swedish data for 14 industries in 3 regions to
investigate the correlation between sick rates and the share of temporary contracts. A positive
correlation would imply a selection effect, a negative relation would imply a worker incentive
effect. The results show that the sick-rate and the share of temporary contracts are negatively
and significantly correlated. Finally, Askildsen et al. (2002) use a panel of Norwegian register
data over the period 1990-95 to distinguish between two alternative explanations for the cycli-
cality in absence behavior: disciplining effects of unemployment and changes in the composition
of the labor force (when labor is scarce marginal workers who are more prone to be absent are
offered jobs). They find that county-specific unemployment rates are negatively related to both
the probability of having a sickness spell in a given year and for the duration of absence. They
find that this also holds for a subsample of stable workers (those who are in the labor force
for a long period). From this they conclude that the selection effect is not causing the cyclical
behavior. So, although as far as absenteeism is concerned incentives and composition effects
are two competing explanations for cyclical fluctuations the incentive effect seems to be the
dominant one.
There are also a number of studies investigating workplace accidents. Kossoris (1938) is a
very early reference to the pro-cyclical pattern in accident rates. Schuster and Rhodes (1985)
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conclude that there is little evidence of overtime hours being systematically related to injury
rate risk. Kniesner and Leeth (1989) presents a numerical simulation, based on data from the
early 1970s, to investigate the economic links between labor market outcomes and the workers’
compensation insurance system. Their results suggest that the observed positive association
between work-related injuries and benefits across states reflects incentives for workers to re-
port injuries rather than that it reflects an economic incentive for employers to invest less in
workplace safety. Meyer et al. (1995) uses a ”natural experiment” in two American states (Ken-
tucky and Michigan) to compare individuals injured before and after increases in the maximum
benefit amount. They find that time out of work increased for those eligible for the higher
benefits and remained unchanged for those whose benefits were constant. Hokkanen (1998)
uses the frequency of industrial injury rates as an indicator of unobservable labor effort. This
idea comes from Shea (1990) who suggests that accidents only occur in the workplace if labor
really works. This can happen for two reasons. First, if labor works (hard), workers become
tired and fatigue may increase the accident rate per hour (or per task). Thus in recessions when
workers perform less tasks per hour or are assigned to non-production activities (maintenance,
repairing) the number of accidents per hour should fall which decreases the accident rate (per
worker). Second, working more hours increases the likelihood of a work related accident even
if the accident rate per hour (task) is unaffected. If firms require more hours worked from em-
ployees in booms and less in recessions, then hours worked will be pro-cyclical and the accident
rate (per worker) positively correlated with aggregate fluctuations in the economy. Hokkanen
does not study injury rates directly but concludes that the injury rate variable that is used as
a proxy for unobserved labor effort is significantly related to output in the production function
regression, “which is to be expected if true labor effort is pro-cyclical”. Shea (1990) suggests
that variables such as overtime, hiring and firing rates, the share of non-production workers,
and the investment-to-capital ratio may affect the accident rate over the business cycle. What
matters for the development of the injury rates are the flows in and out of the labor force, i.e.
the hiring and firing rates. Fairris (1998) shows that in U.S., manufacturing injury rates are
procyclical. Also, in the 1940s and 1950s injury rates in U.S. manufacturing declined whereas
in the 1960s these rates increased. He states that reduced workplace safety due to changes in
the institutional arrangements of shopfloor governance is likely to be responsible for this.
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3 Workplace accidents - theory
This section introduces a model to formalize the relation between cyclical variations in un-
employment and workplace accidents. The idea is that reporting accidents affects a worker’s
reputation and raises the probability that he will be fired. This is especially disadvantageous
for the worker if the value of being unemployed is low. Hence in such circumstances one ex-
pects fewer accidents to be reported. The value of being unemployed varies with the business
cycle. In the empirical analysis we use unemployment as indicator of the cycle because this
is the variable suggested by the model below. Further, if unemployment benefits are high in
a country, becoming unemployed is not so bad. We show that higher unemployment benefits
reduce the effect of the unemployment rate on workers’ reporting behavior.
The idea that reporting an accident may raise the probability of being fired is similar to
an idea in Barmby et. al. (1994). They introduce an efficiency wage model of absenteeism.
Workers shirk in this model by overstating their ’level of sickness’ in order to stay at home.
To discipline workers, the firm invests in a monitoring technology to verify workers’ health
status. If an absent worker is found to be fit enough to work, this is seen as shirking and the
worker is fired. A difference between absenteeism and our model of accidents is the following.
Absenteeism is observable, while the motivation for being absent (sickness or laziness) is not
(directly observable). In our model, an accident is not observable by the firm unless it is
reported by the worker. Once the accident is reported, the firm can determine the damage
caused by the accident and compensate the worker accordingly. This can, for instance, take
the form of days off (leisure) for the worker to allow him to recover.
The idea that not all accidents are reported and that there is a decision involved in reporting
an accident has been documented by other authors. For instance, Glazner et al. (1998) use a
’natural experiment’ to identify underreporting of accidents in the construction industry. And
Biddle et al. (1998) show evidence that ’a significant number of employees with occupational
diseases (...) ”tough it out” or ”work through” the problem’. That is, although these workers
could have decided to report the problem, they instead kept on working without informing the
firm.
As we point out discussing the data below, it does not matter who formally reports the
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accidents to the data source.3 The employer will not know about the accident unless the
worker involved reports the accident. As we show below, it is optimal for the employee to
report very severe accidents. These are probably also the type of accidents that are very hard,
if not impossible, to hide.
Consider the following model of workplace accidents. Each worker has an exogenous proba-
bility φ of experiencing a workplace accident. We assume that φ does not vary over the business
cycle (unlike other models of workplace accidents discussed above). Yet, the model predicts
that reported accidents do vary over the business cycle. The damage (in terms of utility) of the
accident to the worker is denoted by α ≥ 0, which is a random variable with density function
f (.) and distribution function F (.). After the accident has happened, a worker decides whether
to report it or not. If he reports the accident, the worker gets a compensation γ (α) which de-
pends on the damage the worker incurred. It seems reasonable to assume that γ′ (α) ≥ 0.
However, reporting also has a stigma effect: the firm may conclude that workers who report
an accident may be more accident prone than workers who have never reported an accident.
Hence, if the firm has to fire some workers (say, in a downturn) workers who have reported an
accident are more likely to be fired than workers who never reported an accident since such a
report is a signal that the worker is likely to have more accidents in the future. Alternatively, to
the extent that a reported accident is costly to the firm (because the worker is allowed to stay
at home for a couple of days), the firm may want to implicitly discourage reporting of accidents
by giving the impression that workers who have reported in the past are more likely to be fired
once the firm has to shed labor. In other words, although the firm understands that workers
are identical in terms of accident-proneness (hence there is no direct reason to fire someone who
has had an accident in the past), it can still be profitable to create a reputation for firing people
that have reported an accident. In this way, the firm discourages the reporting of accidents.
Even if this is not really the case, our story still goes through as long as workers believe that
their firm may behave in this way. Our model focuses on the dynamics of accidents reports.
Therefore we will not model workers as differing in accident proneness nor the reputation value
for the firm to be seen as tough on accidents.
3The exception is data taken from a household survey asking working family members whether they have
had a work related accident in the past year. In such a survey workers may report an accident that they did
not report at their firm. We have no such data. Our prediction would be that in such a data set accidents are
not cyclical.
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Using a dynamic model of the labor market in the vein of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
let VE (t) denote the value of having a job at time t while the worker has never reported an
accident at its current employer.4 We assume that VE (t) is determined by the following Bellman
equation
ρVE (t) = w + φ
∫ +∞
0
[−α+ max {γ (α) + VA (t)− VE (t) , 0}] f (α) dα
+δE (Vu (t)− VE (t)) + V̇E (t) (1)
where ρ is the discount rate, VA (t) is the value of employment once a worker has reported
an accident, Vu (t) is the value of being unemployed and δE is the (flow) probability of being
fired. Thus, the value of being employed at the firm equals the sum of four terms: the wage
w received while being employed, the (flow) probability that an accident happens (see below),
the firing probability δE and the change in the value of VE (t).
We assume that either the wage is determined by Nash bargaining5 or that workers are
free to quit the job. Assuming that workers have some bargaining power, both imply that
VE (t) − Vu (t) > 0. Below we specify a matching model for unemployment. In that case, the
inequality VE (t) − Vu (t) > 0 holds if w − φ
∫ +∞
0
αf (α) dα exceeds the unemployment benefit
level b.
We view equation (1) as a differential equation with an exogenous time path for Vu (.). The
time path for VA (.) is derived below. The time path for Vu (.) can be perfectly predicted by
agents6 and we assume that |Vu (.)| < M for some M > 0. Below we consider a search and
matching imperfection in the labor market which implies that b
ρ











, we indeed find
that |Vu (t)| < M for all t.
Next, consider the worker’s response after an accident happens. The accident gives him the
disutility α of the damage. Then the worker decides whether to report the accident or not. If
4 We assume that when a worker is fired and finds a new job, his new employer does not know whether he
has reported accidents at his previous employers.
5There is an issue here whether the Nash bargained wage is continuously renegotiated in response to, for
instance, changes in Vu (t) over time. For notational simplicity we assume that w is constant over time, however
all results below go through if w would be indexed by t as well.
6If this were not the case, the analysis would be done in terms of expected values for unemployment,
employment etc. For the problem we are considering, nothing would be gained by working in terms of expected
values.
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he does not report the accident, he gets no compensation nor a stigma. If he does report the
accident, he gets the compensation γ (α) from the firm, but also has the reputation of someone
who has reported an accident. That is, his continuation pay off is VA (t) instead of VE (t).
We assume that the Bellman equation for someone who has reported an accident equals
ρVA (t) = w + φ
∫ +∞
0
[−α+ γ (α)] f (α) dα+ δA (Vu (t)− VA (t)) + V̇A (t) (2)
where δA is the probability that a worker who has reported an accident will be fired. As
mentioned above, we assume that workers who have reported an accident are more likely to
be fired (when the firm has to fire employees) than workers who have reported no accidents.
Hence, we assume that δA > δE. This is our reduced form modeling of the idea that (workers
think that) firms are more likely to fire workers who have reported an accident. Note that this
does not imply firms firing workers on the spot after an accident (which would be illegal). It
is only that in a future state of the world where the firm has to fire employees (workers think
that) the firm is more likely to fire someone who has reported an accident in the past. Hence,
a worker’s expected remaining tenure with the firm goes down after reporting an accident.
We also assume that reporting an accident has no effect on a worker’s wage, which would
indeed be illegal in most if not all countries in our dataset. Next, we suppose, for simplicity, that
reporting more than one accident instead of just one accident has no effect on the probability
of being fired. This is just to simplify notation. All the results below go through as long as the
probability of being fired δA is nondecreasing in the number of accidents reported. Since we
assume that δA does not further increase by reporting more than one accident, it is optimal for
the worker to report each accident after the first one and receive the compensation γ (α) from
the firm.
Since Vu (t) − VE (t) < 0 and because a worker who has not reported an accident yet can
always mimic the behavior of a worker who has already reported an accident, we find that
δA > δE implies VE (t) > VA (t). In particular, comparing equations (1) and (2) term by term,
we see the following. The wage is the same in both cases. An employed worker has the option
to report all accidents (but may do better to keep silent about minor accidents) and hence
the term with the integral is at least as big in equation (1) as in equation (2). Finally, the
higher value for δ in equation (2) leads to a more negative term due to the probability of
unemployment. Hence, no matter how VE and VA vary over time, it is always the case that
VE (t) > VA (t).
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It is now straightforward to see that a worker’s optimal reporting strategy takes the following
form. Report an accident if and only if γ (α) − (VE (t)− VA (t)) ≥ 0. Since by assumption
γ′ (α) ≥ 0, for given VE (t) − VA (t) only accidents α ≥ ᾱ are reported. Hence, conditional on
VE (t)−VA (t) the probability that an accident is reported equals φ (1− F (ᾱ)). Next note that
as VE (t)−VA (t) becomes smaller, the loss of reporting an accident becomes smaller, and hence
more accidents will be reported.
So the crucial question is how the path of Vu (.) affects the difference VE (.)−VA (.), because
that is the channel through which the unemployment rate affects the number of accidents
reported. In proposition 1 in appendix 2 we prove formally the following intuitive result. A
higher value of Vu reduces VE − VA and hence leads to more accidents being reported. The
intuition is that with high Vu, the stigma of having reported an accident (and associated higher
probability of being fired) is not so bad since becoming unemployed is not so bad. Hence, more
accidents get reported.
Hence the channel in the reporting explanation is from unemployment u (t) to the value
of being unemployed Vu (t) and then to the accidents that are reported α > ᾱ. The working
conditions explanation takes reporting as given and assumes that the probability of an accident
φ is affected by the business cycle. In particular, it assumes that φ rises with employment
and hours worked and falls with unemployment. As employment rises, new unexperienced
workers are hired which are more likely to cause accidents involving themselves and others. As
employment falls, not many inexperienced workers are hired, reducing the probability of an
accident. Further, in a boom unemployment is low and workers work harder and more hours.
This may lead them to become less careful and hence more accidents happen. These working
conditions explanations are true for all α. Thus one would expect the same cyclicality in non-
fatal and fatal accidents. In contrast, with the reporting explanation fatal accidents (high α)
are always reported irrespective of the state of the cycle. The reporting of non-fatal accidents
(lower α) depends on the state of cycle via the value of being unemployed Vu.
Up until now, we have analyzed the effects of Vu on the reported number of accidents.
However, in the empirical analysis we look at the effects of the business cycle, proxied by
unemployment rate u (.), on the number of reported accidents. The remainder of this section
links the development of u (.) to the development of Vu (.). In order to do this, we work with a
search and matching model in the labor market. In particular, we assume that the development
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of Vu (.) is determined by the following differential equation
ρVu (t) = b+ q (u (t)) [VE (t)− Vu (t)] + V̇u (t) (3)
where b is the unemployment benefit level and q (.) denotes the probability that an unemployed
worker is matched with job. We assume that b < w+ φ
∫ +∞
0
[−α+ γ (a)]f (α) dα which implies
that a worker is better off having a job than remaining unemployed. Since we assume that a new
employer does not know whether the worker has reported an accident in his previous job, the
value of a new job is VE irrespective of the history of the worker. We view this as a differential
equation determining Vu (t) as a function of the exogenous time path for unemployment u (t),
where VE (t) is determined by equation (1).
We assume that the probability of getting a job is decreasing in the unemployment level
u (t), that is dq(u(t))
du(t)
< 0 for all t. This implies that the value of being unemployed Vu falls with
the unemployment level, since a higher unemployment level increases the expected duration of
the unemployment spell. The way we think of the function q (.) is as a matching probability,
where the number of matches each period equals m (u (t) , v (t)) for some matching function
m (., .) and where v (t) denotes the number of vacancies posted at time t. Hence the probability
of being matched at time t for an unemployed worker equals m(u(t),v(t))
u(t)
. We do not model the
number of vacancies v (t) but assume that a Beveridge curve exists (see for example Nickell et al.
(2003)). That is, v (t) is negatively correlated with u (t). Thus we write q (u (t)) = m(u(t),v(u(t)))
u(t)
,
with q′ (u) < 0.
Hence, as unemployment goes up, the value of becoming unemployed goes down and there-
fore less accidents are reported. Note that it is unemployment u(.) that affects the reporting
of accidents, not employment. Although employment and unemployment may be correlated,
the employment rate does not (directly) affect the value of being unemployed. Thus the theory
points to unemployment as the relevant measure of the business cycle. In contrast, a theory
based on the idea that in a boom new -inexperienced- workers are hired who are more likely
to cause or be involved in an accident predicts that accidents are related to the employment
rate (in particular, the change in the employment rate) as relevant variable summarizing the
business cycle. As shown below, we do not find the latter effect in the data.
We can also show the following result. As unemployment benefits go up, the value of
becoming unemployed varies less with the unemployment rate (unemployment benefits work
as an insurance). Therefore one should expect reported accidents to vary less pronounced with
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unemployment as the unemployment benefits are higher. The proof of this result can be found
in the appendix.
Lemma 1 If VE (t) − Vu (t) is linear (or concave) and decreasing in Vu (t) then it is the
case that dVu
du







For instance, if workers and firms Nash bargain about the wage it is the case that VE − Vu
is linear and decreasing in Vu. To see this, consider the case where workers and firms bargain
about the value of being employed VE (determined by the wage w). Then VE solves
max
VE
(VE − Vu)β (Y − VE)1−β
where Vu is the fall back position of the worker, Y is the discounted expected output produced
by the worker. We assume (as usual) that the there is free entry into vacancy creation and
hence the fall back position of the firm equals 0 (zero). It is routine to verify that in this case
VE − Vu is linear and decreasing in Vu. Thus we have in this case that higher unemployment
benefit levels make the value of being unemployed Vu less dependent on the unemployment
rate u. This insurance role of unemployment benefits also implies that the number of accidents
reported should depend less on the unemployment rate as unemployment benefits are higher.
Countries can differ in a number of aspects that are not discussed here (and for which we have
no variables in the empirical analysis). For instance, employment protection legislation differs
between countries and this will affect the workers’ reporting decisions. The better employment
protection is in a country, the more accidents one would expect a worker to report. This is true,
but this mainly affects the level of accident reports. We would still expect the cyclical behavior
of accident reports to the extent that employment protection is not perfect. Hence in countries
with strong employment protection legislation, the cyclical pattern in accident reports (and
hence the accident rate) will not disappear, although the amplitude may be smaller.
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4 Workplace accidents across the OECD
According to the European Statistics on Accidents at Work an accident at work is defined
as a ”discrete occurrence in the course of work, which leads to physical or mental harm.”7
Workplace accidents are a common phenomenon. In the EU for example in 1998 there were
4.7 million occupational accidents leading to more than 3 days’ absence from work, which is
equivalent to an accident rate - i.e. the probability that a worker is involved in a workplace
accident - of 4.1%. The total number of accidents, including those which did not involve absence
from work amounted to 7.4 million, equivalent to an accident rate of 6.4%. A fatal accident
is defined as an accident, which leads to the death of a victim within one year (after the day)
of the accident. The incidence of accident-related deaths was 5.0 per 100,000 workers. Finally,
annually around 150 million working days are lost due to non-fatal accidents, which is about
0.5% of total working time (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2001)).
4.1 Data
There are clear differences in the ways in which countries define and register workplace accidents
(see also OECD (1989) for an overview). Differences refer for example to the minimum number
of working days lost to the accidents, the severeness of the accidents, whether or not commuting
accidents are included. Our point of departure is that a firm does not know about an accident
unless it is reported by the employee(s) involved. Firms may have an incentive to underreport
accidents to avoid further probes by workplace safety inspectors. However, there is no reason
why this should be cyclical.
There are large differences between countries in workplace accidents, as shown in Table 1. In
1990 there were 115,000 workplace accidents in Belgium of which 106 were fatal, in France there
were 760,000 workplace accidents of which 1213 were fatal, in Germany there were 1.9 million
workplace accidents of which 1712 were fatal, while in the US there were 3.1 million workplace
accidents of which almost 3000 were fatal. The share of fatal accidents as a percentage of total
workplace accidents ranges from a low 0.07% in Finland and Portugal to as high as 2.4% in
7This includes cases of acute poisoning and willful acts of other persons but excludes self-inflicted injuries
and commuting accidents. ”In the course of work” means whilst engaged in an occupational activity or during
the time spent at work. This includes cases of road traffic accidents in the course of work.
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Ireland. The latter high share is also because the number of non-fatal workplace accidents in
Ireland is rather low. The appendix provides more details about the data.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of (non-fatal) workplace accident rates and unemployment rates
for the 16 OECD countries in our sample. As shown in many but not all countries there is a
downward trend in workplace accident rates. Countries where there is no clear downward trend
are Denmark, Ireland and Spain. Nevertheless, for some countries it is clear that there is an
inverse relationship between workplace accidents and unemployment. For example the increase
in unemployment rate in the early 1990s in Canada, Finland and Sweden is accompanied by
a major drop in the workplace accident rate. In Ireland the major drop in unemployment
rate since the mid 1990s is accompanied by a strong increase in the workplace accident rate.
In countries like Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain there are several upturns and
downturns in the unemployment rates where the accident rates show mirror images. For the
US this is also the case until the early 1990s.
As is obvious from Table 1 there was a big range in the 1990 accident rate - defined as the
ratio of the number of workplace accidents and the number of employees - across the OECD,
from as low as 0.2% in Ireland to 5.5% in Spain and 6.5% in Portugal. These differences
partly have to do with the definition of workplace accidents. In Ireland, Italy and Germany
for example workplace accidents refer to incapacity of the worker due to an accident of 4
workdays or more. In Finland and the UK the threshold is 3 workdays while for most of the
countries all cases of injury with lost workdays are counted as workplace accidents. Also for
fatal workplace accidents there is a wide difference between countries from a low 0.001% in the
Netherlands and the UK to a high 0.07% in Italy. In the same year the unemployment rate
varied from 1.8% in Sweden and Switzerland to 16% in Spain. Since the differences in level of
workplace accidents may have more to do with differences in data collection than they have to
do with real differences it is especially the within country correlation between accident rates
and unemployment rates which is interesting to investigate.
Table 2 shows for 1990 the accident rate distinguished by industry. Both within the same
country as across countries there are big differences across industries. The non-fatal accident
rates in manufacturing industries ranges from a low 0.8% in Ireland to a high 12.7% in Por-
tugal. The fatal accident rate in manufacturing is with 0.001% the lowest in the Netherlands
and the UK and the highest in Spain, with 0.011%. In most of the countries the accident
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rates in construction are higher than those in manufacturing. The non-fatal accident rate in
construction was with 0.2% the lowest in Ireland and with 16.9% the highest in Switzerland.
The fatal accident rate in construction was with 0.003% the lowest in the Netherlands and
with 0.028% the highest in Spain. Table 2 also shows that in trade and other industries the
workplace accident rates were usually lower than those in manufacturing and construction.
4.2 Parameter estimates
Our empirical analysis is based on the relationship between workplace accidents and unemploy-
ment rates, which we derived in the theoretical section. As discussed before, countries differ in
the way they register and collect data on workplace accidents. The structure of the workforce
may influence the level of the workplace accident rate. In 1998 workers in the EU employed
for less than two years were 1.2 to 1.3 times more likely to have an accident than the average
worker, irrespective of whether they had a temporary or permanent contract.8 Furthermore,
the risk of an accident for people aged between 18 and 24 was 1.4 times the average. Also, as
shown in Table 2 there are big differences between industries. This means that the industrial
structure of a country will affect its workplace accident rates. In the analysis we account for
these fixed differences between countries in workplace accident rate. It may also be the case
that calendar year effects that account for joint influences over time are relevant. And, it
may be that there are country-specific time trends that influence the evolution of workplace
accidents. These country-specific time trends could reflect working conditions that gradually
improve or deteriorate, changes in the industrial structure et cetera. Therefore, we add fixed
effects for countries and calendar years and also country specific time trends to the relationship
between non-fatal accidents and unemployment:
ln(ai,t) = β0i + β0t + β1iτ + β2 ln(ui,t) + εi,t (4)
where a is the non-fatal workplace accident rate, τ is a time trend, u is the unemployment
rate, i is a subscript for country, t is the subscript for time and εi,t are the error terms. When
estimating the parameters of this equation we also added some country-specific dummies to
account for breaks in series (see Table A1 for details). To account for possible heteroscedasticity
we calculated robust standard errors. We also did similar regressions with the fatal accident
8Based on Eurostat information on workplace accidents. Below we discuss these data in more detail.
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rates (ln(fai,t)) as dependent variable. If it is the case that reporting behavior drives the
relationship between the unemployment rate and the non-fatal workplace accident rate we
expect β2 to be significantly smaller than zero in the case of non-fatal workplace accident rates,
while in the case of fatal workplace accident rates β2 should not differ significantly from zero.
We base our estimates on a dataset from 16 countries containing 314 observations in total.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The first line of the table shows the parameter
estimates of β2 for both non-fatal and fatal workplace accident rates. The elasticity of non-fatal
workplace accidents with respect to unemployment equals −0.32 and is significantly different
from zero. It is obvious that the unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on non-
fatal accidents. For fatal accidents we find an elasticity with respect to unemployment of
−0.03, insignificantly different from zero. So, the first line of Table 3 indicates that the cyclical
fluctuations in workplace accidents most likely have to do with cyclical fluctuations in reporting
behavior. If workplace conditions would explain the cyclical behavior of non-fatal accidents,
it should also be the case that fatal accidents vary with unemployment. However, the fatal
accidents rate is not affected by changes in the unemployment rate.
Table 3 also contains the results of additional estimates where we introduced potential
additional explanatory variables. In the theoretical section we argued that the reporting rate
of workplace accidents is influenced by the consequences of becoming unemployed (Vu). We
have stressed the level effect of unemployment here, but there might also have been a separate
effect of the change in unemployment. To investigate whether this is the case, we introduce
∆ ln(ui,t), the change in the unemployment rate as explanatory variable (∆ is the indicator
for first differences). As shown in the second line of Table 3 if we introduce the change in
unemployment rate as additional explanatory variable the parameter estimates are very much
unaffected. The change in unemployment rate affects neither the non-fatal accident rates nor the
fatal workplace accident rate. Thus there is no additional effect of the change in unemployment
(besides the level effect) on the number of accidents reported.
As an alternative to the reporting behavior explanation of cyclical fluctuations in workplace
accidents, the workplace safety explanation predicts that the change in employment is positively
related to workplace accidents since an increase in employment coincides with a lot of new
hirings while a decrease in employment is related to few new hirings. The newly hired workers
are less experienced than incumbent workers and hence more accident prone. This raises φ
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on average and should lead to more fatal and non-fatal accidents. The third line in Table 3
introduces ∆ ln(ei,t), the change in employment e as explanatory variable. We find that this
additional variable has no significant effect on either the non-fatal or the fatal accident rate.
The workplace safety explanation also predicts that working hours have a positive effect on
workplace accidents because working longer increases the probability of an accident (increases
φ). The fourth estimate in Table 3 introduces ln(hi,t), where h is the hours actually work per
person employed as additional explanatory variable. As shown the estimation results hardly
change and the coefficient of ln(hi,t) is not significant. Apparently, the number of working hours
neither affects non-fatal workplace accidents nor fatal workplace accidents.
The fifth estimate presented in Table 3 introduces as additional explanatory variable s, the
share of manufacturing and construction in total employment. In these industries the accident
rates are above average and it may be that cyclical fluctuations in the employment shares of
these industries represent fluctuations in (economy wide) average workplace safety. There is a
negative but imperfect correlation between the unemployment rate and the employment share
of manufacturing and construction. So, if the unemployment rate indeed mainly affects the
reporting behavior of the worker while the employment share of manufacturing and construction
affects average workplace safety we expect this share to affect fatal accidents as well as non-
fatal accidents. Indeed, if employment share of manufacturing and construction is the only
explanatory variable there is a significant positive effect on the non-fatal accident rate. However,
as shown, if the unemployment rate is also included the employment share of manufacturing
and construction does not affect the non-fatal accident rate. For fatal accident rates there is
a positive and significant effect. If the employment share of manufacturing and construction
increases there are more fatal accidents. From this we conclude that the fatal accident rate is
a suitable indicator for (economy wide) average workplace safety while for non-fatal accidents
fluctuations in reporting behavior dominate fluctuations in average workplace safety.
All in all, it seems that high unemployment rates have a significant negative effect on
workplace accident rates whereas changes in unemployment, changes in employment, working
hours and industrial structure do not affect non-fatal accident rates. Fatal accident rates are not
influenced by labor market conditions at all. From this we conclude that cyclical fluctuations
in the non-fatal workplace accident rate are driven by the reporting behavior of the workers
and not by changes in workplace safety.
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Table 4 shows additional estimation results for the non-fatal workplace accident rates.
As indicated in the theoretical section, the probability that an accident is reported equals
φ (1− F (ᾱ)) , where φ is the exogenous probability of experiencing a workplace accident, α
is the disutility of the damage caused by the accidents and accidents for which α ≥ ᾱ are
reported. The cyclicality in the reported workplace accidents is driven by the cyclicality in
ᾱ. In the estimates in Table 4 the fatal workplace accident rate is introduced as explanatory
variable, because this is a proxy for fluctuations in φ. The first line of Table 4 shows that
indeed there is a positive relationship between fatal and non-fatal workplace accidents with an
elasticity of 0.20. This is our preferred estimate. We interpret this positive relation as induced
by in-country variation in workplace safety. The other estimation results in Table 4 illustrate
how robust the parameter estimates are by estimating our preferred regression using various
subsamples.
In the second estimate of Table 4 we split the sample in two subperiods, 1976-1989 and
1990-2001. As shown for both periods we find that the unemployment rate has a negative
effect on the non-fatal workplace accident rate, while the fatal accident rate has a positive
effect. The third estimate shows the parameter estimates if we only include EU countries.
Then, the parameter estimates are almost identical to those obtained by using the full sample.
The fourth set of estimates of Table 4 shows the parameter estimates if industry specific data
on workplace accidents are used. We make a distinction between three groups of industries:
manufacturing, construction and other industries. In all cases we find that the (national)
unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on the industry workplace accident rates.
When we distinguish between industries we no longer find that the fatal accident rates have a
significant positive effect on the non-fatal workplace accident rates. We think that this may
have to do with difficulties in allocating accident information to the various industries. Also,
for many countries there has been a change in the industrial classification which may affect the
results. Because the information at the industry level is not available for all the years used in
the previous estimates the number of observations is reduced from 314 to 238.9 The last line of
the fourth estimates shows that for the reduced dataset we find very similar results as for the
complete dataset.
9 Greece is absent completely due to the lack of separate information for fatal and non-fatal workplace
accidents by industry.
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In the final set of estimates in Table 4, we investigate to what extent institutions matter.10
First, we make a distinction between countries with a high union density and countries with a
low union density. We find that there is hardly any difference in parameter estimates for the two
groups of countries. Then, we make a distinction between countries with low unemployment
benefits and countries with high unemployment benefits. Now, we do find a difference. As
predicted in Lemma 1, for countries with low unemployment benefits the cyclicality in workplace
accidents is stronger than for countries with high unemployment benefits. This confirms the
reporting behavior explanation since there is no effect of unemployment benefits on workplace
conditions. In countries where the consequences of unemployment, i.e. countries with high
unemployment benefits, are less severe the elasticity of non-fatal workplace accidents with
respect to the unemployment rate is not that big.
When we interact the level of unemployment benefits and the type of data (reported/compensated)
with the unemployment rate we also find significant coefficients for the interaction terms. The
estimated coefficients (t-statistics) are:
ln(ui,t) -0.26(6.9)
ln(ui,t).(ubi − ubi) 0.011(5.5)
ln(ui,t).dreported -0.11 (2.9)
ln(fait) 0.19(5.3)
where ub represents unemployment benefits (replacement rates), dreported is a dummy with
a value of 1 if the country collects reported accidents data and a value of 0 otherwise, and
all estimates contain fixed effects for country and calendar year and also include country-
specific time trends. These results show that as expected in countries with low unemployment
benefits and countries that have reported accident data the effect of unemployment on non-fatal
workplace accidents is stronger than in other countries.
As a final sensitivity analysis we also used data from Eurostat. Eurostat publishes harmo-
nized data on accidents at work, which are collected in the framework of the European Statistics
on Accidents at Work (ESAW). The data refer to accidents at work resulting in more than 3
days absence from work (serious accidents) and fatal accidents. A fatal accident is defined as
an accident which leads to the death of a victim within one year of the accident. The national
10 The information about the institutions is derived from Boone and Van Ours (2004).
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ESAW sources are the declarations of accidents at work, either to the public (Social Security)
or private specific insurance for accidents at work, or to other relevant national authority (La-
bor Inspection, etc.) for countries having a “universal” Social Security system. The Eurostat
accidents at work data collection started in 1994 so that now data are available over the period
1994-2002 for 10 countries.11 The main disadvantage of the Eurostat data is the short time
period; the main advantage is that the data are harmonized. Table 5 gives an overview of the
differences between the accident rates based on ILO information and on Eurostat information.12
As shown, there are differences between the two data sources but the overall pattern is very
similar: Spain has the highest accidents rate, Sweden and the UK have the lowest.
Table 6 shows parameter estimates based on the Eurostat data. Unemployment has a clear
negative effect on the non-fatal accident rate. The estimated parameter is very similar to the
ones presented in Tables 3 and 4. The fatal accident rate has a positive effect on the non-fatal
accidents rate. The number of annual working hours also has a positive effect on the non-fatal
accident rate, which seems to make more sense than the negative (although insignificant) effect
found in table 3. The intuition here is that the more hours an employee works per year, the
more likely he is to experience a work related accident (even if the accident rate per hour is
unchanged).13
5 Conclusions
In recessions the rate of workplace accidents is lower than it is in booms. We distinguish between
two possible explanations for this phenomenon: workplace safety and reporting behavior. The
workplace safety explanation predicts that the unemployment rate is negatively related to
workplace accidents because effort is negatively related to unemployment and high effort makes
accidents more likely. Furthermore, it predicts that working hours are positively related to
workplace accidents because working longer increases the probability of an accident to occur.
11Data are available for more than 10 countries but over a shorter time period. There is also information
about severity of accidents but not on a time series cross country basis.
12The rate are calculated using the same information about employment (see Appendix 1) so that the only
difference between the two series refers to the nominators.
13Although not reported, unemployment has again an insignificant effect on the fatal accidents rate, which is
in line with estimates presented in Table 3.
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Also, the change in employment is positively related to workplace accidents since an increase in
employment coincides with a lot of new hirings while a decrease in employment is related to few
new hirings. The ‘reporting’ explanation predicts that the rate of unemployment is negatively
related to the rate of workplace accidents. Workers fear that the chance that they are fired
goes up next time the firm needs to shed labor if they report an accident. If unemployment
is high, it will take a long time before another job is found and hence the worker prefers not
to report an accident. Another distinction between the two alternative explanations has to do
with fatal accidents. If cycles in workplace safety drive the cycles in workplace accidents this
should also be the case for fatal accidents. If reporting behavior of workers is relevant then fatal
accidents should not be affected by the unemployment rate or changes in the unemployment
rate, because fatal accidents are always reported.
In our empirical analysis based on information from OECD countries we find that workplace
accidents are inversely related to the unemployment rate, while working hours and changes in
employment rate do not affect the accident rate. Furthermore, fatal accident rates do not seem
to be related to labor market conditions in terms of unemployment. When we include the
fatal workplace accident rate as explanatory variable we find a positive and significant effect
on non-fatal accidents. Fatal accidents turn out to be related to the employment shares of
manufacturing and construction. Thus fatal workplace accidents are an indicator of economy
wide workplace safety. Therefore, our results imply that the variation in non-fatal workplace
accidents is related to both economy wide workplace safety (through employment shares of
industries) and reporting behavior (as picked up by the unemployment rate). In our sensitivity
analysis we also find that these results are robust for various subsamples related to different
time periods and different groups of countries. When we interact the level of unemployment
benefits with the unemployment rate we find a positive coefficient for the interaction term.
So, the higher the unemployment benefits the smaller the effect of unemployment on non-fatal
workplace accidents. This is again an indication of the relevance of reporting behavior.
From all this we conclude that labor market conditions influence statistical information on
workplace accidents through reporting behavior of workers. If unemployment is high workers are
less likely to report about workplace accidents than they are in situations of low unemployment.
We find no evidence that workplace safety deteriorates in cyclical upturns or that recessions
are good for workplace safety.
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6 Appendix 1: Information about the data
The thirteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians (Geneva, 1992) defined work
accidents as accidents occurring at or in the course of work which may result in death, personal
injury or disease. International comparisons of information about workplace accidents are
difficult because sources of data, reporting procedures and coverage of the data may differ
between countries. Coverage may be limited to certain types of workers or injuries giving rise
to more than a certain number of days of absence from work.
The sources of information for the data used in the analysis are the following:
• Workplace accidents: ILO Bureau of statistics (LABORSTA)
• Unemployment rates: OECD labor force statistics
• Employment and working hours: GGDC: University of Groningen and The Conference
Board, Growth & Development Center Total Economy Database, 2002, http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc
Although for some countries information about workplace accidents goes back to 1970 for most
of the countries considered this information starts in later years. Therefore, our (maximum)
calendar period is 1975-2001. Table A1 describes some general characteristics of the information
on workplace accidents.
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Table A1 Information about workplace accidents in ILO statistics
Sourcea) Subjectb) Minimum Period Breaksc)
period
(days)
Belgiumd) FA 82 1 1984-2001 s93-97,s98-01
Canada FA 82 1 1985-2000
Denmark FF 81 1 1978-2001 s91-01
Finland FA 82 3 1978-2000 s93-00
France FA 82 1 1975-2000
Germanye) FA 82 4 1990-2000
Greece FA 82 1 1979-1999 s82-99
Ireland FF 81 4 1976-1999 s90-99
Italy FA 82 4 1979-2001 s91-01
Netherlands FA 81 1 1976-1989
Portugal FA 81 1 1979-2000 s89-00
Spaine) FA 81 1 1980-2001 s88-01
Sweden FA 81 1 1979-2000 d94
Switzerland FA 82 1 1984-2000
United Kingdom FF 81 3 1986-2000 d98
United States DA 81 1 1976-1991
a) ILO classification. Source: DA = labor related establishment survey, FA = insurance records, FF
= labor inspectorate records.
b) Subject: 81 = reported, 82 = compensated
c) Breaks in series as accounted for in the empirical analysis; s = shift concerning a time period; d =
dummy variable for a particular year
d) Including commuting accidents
e) Fatal accidents: deaths occurring within one month of accident
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7 Appendix 2: Mathematical results
Proposition 1 Consider a time path for the value of being unemployed Vu (t) and an alterna-
tive time path Vu (t) + ε. Then ε > 0 implies that the number of accidents reported under the
alternative time path exceeds the number of accidents reported under the original time path.
Proof of proposition We begin with some preliminary results that will be used later on.
In particular, we introduce a class of differential equations which we do not solve as initial value
problems. Instead we impose a condition on the steady state behavior of the solution to the
differential equation.
Lemma 1 Let g (.) be a real valued function of t ∈ R with |g (.)| < M for some M > 0.
Consider the differential equation
ψh (t) = g (t) + ḣ (t) (5)
with the following boundary condition: if for some T > 0 it is the case that g (t) = ḡ for all
t ≥ T then h (t) = ḡ
ψ
for all t ≥ T .











To solve differential equation (5) we solve the homogenous part of the equation first, that is
ψh (t) = ḣ (t)
The solution to this equation is clearly
h (t) = ceψt
In order to solve the original equation, we write the constant c as a function of t. So we try as
a solution h (t) = c (t) eψt. Substituting this into equation (5), we get
ψc (t) eψt = g (t) + c′ (t) eψt + ψc (t) eψt
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or equivalently
c′ (t) = −e−ψtg (t)




e−ψsg (s) ds+ c0





e−ψsg (s) ds+ c0
)
eψt
Using the boundary condition that g (t) = ḡ for all t must imply h (t) = ḡ
ψ
yields c0 = 0. Hence










Lemma 2 Let ḡδ (t) denote

















for ψ > 0.
Proof















































and hence the result in equation (6) follows. Q.E.D.
29
Lemma 3 The solution to differential equations (1) and (2), where Vu (t) is some function of










V̄ ρ+δAu (t) (7)













ρ+ δE + φ (1− F (ᾱ))
(8)
where ᾱ is determined by γ (ᾱ) = VE (t)− VA (t) and the function g (.) is defined as
g (t) ≡ δA
ρ+ δA
V̄ ρ+δAu (t)− Vu (t) (9)
Proof
Consider first the equation for VA (t). Writing equation (2) as
(ρ+ δA)VA (t) = w + φ
∫ +∞
0
[−α+ γ (α)] f (α) dα+ δAVu (t) + V̇A (t) (10)
we see it is a differential equation of the form (5). Hence lemma 1 implies that the solution can
be written as equation (7).
Now turn to the difference VE (t)− VA (t). Writing equation (1) as
(ρ+ δE)VE (t) = w − φ
∫ +∞
0
αf (α) dα+ φ
∫ +∞
ᾱ
[γ (α)− (VE (t)− VA (t))] f (α) dα+
δEVu (t) + V̇E (t) (11)
where ᾱ is the smallest value of α for which
max {γ (α)− (VE (t)− VA (t)) , 0} = γ (α)− (VE (t)− VA (t))
(recall that γ (.) is nondecreasing in α). In other words, by continuity of γ (.), we have that
γ (ᾱ) = VE (t)− VA (t)
Subtracting from (11) equation (10), we get




γ (α) f (α) dα− φ [VE (t)− VA (t)] (1− F (ᾱ))
− (δA − δE)Vu (t) +
[
V̇E (t)− V̇A (t)
]
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Defining ∆EA (t) ≡ VE (t)− VA (t) and substituting into this equation the solution for VA (t) in
equation (7) we find
(ρ+ δE + φ (1− F (ᾱ))) ∆EA (t) = −φ
∫ ᾱ
0












V̄ ρ+δA (t)− Vu (t)
)
+ ∆̇EA (t)
First, note that ᾱ is a function of ∆EA (t), but due to an Envelope Theorem type of argument
we can ignore this indirect effect on VE via ᾱ. Therefore we can also ignore the effect of a
change in ᾱ on ∆EA (t). Second, note that this differential equation for ∆EA (t) has the same
form as equation (5). Applying the solution in lemma 1 gives us equation (8) above. Q.E.D.
Now we can characterize the proof of the proposition above.
The number of accidents reported at time t depends negatively on ∆EA (t) because γ (ᾱ) =
∆EA and the fraction of accidents reported equals (1− F (ᾱ)). Hence showing that under time
path Vu (t) + ε with ε > 0 more accidents are reported than under time path Vu (t) boils down
to showing that ∆EA (t) is lower with Vu (t) + ε than with Vu (t). Looking at the solution in
equation (8), a sufficient condition for this is that g (t) as defined in equation (9) is always
lower under path Vu (t) + ε than under path Vu (t). Let gε (t) denote the path for g (t) under
Vu (t) + ε while g0 (t) denotes the path under Vu (t). Then we want to prove that g0 (t)− gε (t)
is positive for all t. It is routine to verify that











V̄ ρ+δAu (t) + ε
)







Proof of lemma 1
To find the effect of a change in u on the value of being unemployed Vu, we define ∆Eu as
follows:
∆Eu = VE − Vu
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In general ∆Eu will be a function of Vu: ∆Eu (Vu). The higher Vu is the smaller this difference
becomes, ∆′Eu (Vu) < 0. Differentiating the expression for the value of being unemployed with
respect to u we get
(ρ+ q (u) (−∆′Eu (Vu)))
dVu
du





q′ (u) ∆Eu (Vu)
(ρ+ q (u) (−∆′Eu (Vu)))
< 0








∆′Eu (Vu) (ρ+ q (u) (−∆′Eu (Vu)))−∆Eu (Vu) q (u) (−∆′′Eu (Vu))







8 Tables and graphs
Table 1 Fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and unemployment rates; 1990a)
Fatal Non-fatal Unemployment
accidents accidents rate
(#) (0.01%) (1000) (%) (%)
Belgium 106 0.3 115 3.2 7.2
Canada 943 0.6 594 4.7 8.1
Denmark 71 0.3 46 1.7 8.3
Finland 74 0.3 103 4.1 3.1
France 1213 0.6 760 3.9 9.2
Germany 1712 0.5 1902 5.3 8.4
Greece 84 0.2 28 0.7 7.0
Ireland 73 0.6 3 0.2 14.8
Italy 1423 0.7 922 4.3 11.4
Netherlands 59 0.1 66 1.1 8.2
Portugal 203 0.4 305 6.5 4.7
Spain 1446 1.1 695 5.5 16.0
Sweden 117 0.3 87 2.0 1.8
Switzerland 153 0.4 142 3.8 1.8
United Kingdom 359 0.1 184 0.7 6.8
United States 2900 0.2 3124 2.6 5.6
Total 10,936 - 9076 - -
a) Number of accidents as a percentage of the number of workers; unemployment as % of the
labor force; Germany 1994; Ireland and Switzerland 1991; Netherlands 1989.
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Table 2 Fatal accident rate and non-fatal accident rates by industry; 1990a)
Fatal accidents (0.01%) Non-fatal accidents (%)
Industry 3 5 6 10 Total 3 5 6 10 Total
Belgium 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 6.4 8.0 2.9 1.2 3.2
Canada 0.6 2.0 0.2 0.7 0.6 9.6 7.9 4.2 3.1 4.7
Denmark 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 3.4 2.5 0.6 1.2 1.7
Finland 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 7.8 10.9 2.8 2.1 4.1
France 0.7 2.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 7.1 12.6 3.9 1.7 3.9
Germany 0.3 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 5.0 12.3 3.5 4.7 5.3
Greece - - - - - 1.9 2.3 0.3 0.3 0.7
Ireland 0.2 1.3 - 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Italy 0.6 1.8 0.1 0.7 0.7 7.4 7.6 1.3 3.6 4.3
Netherlands 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 3.8 1.0 0.5 1.1
Portugal 0.4 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 12.7 15.3 4.1 2.8 6.5
Spain 1.1 2.8 0.6 1.0 1.1 10.3 11.4 4.1 2.7 5.5
Sweden 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.3 3.4 4.0 1.2 1.4 2.0
Switzerland 0.5 2.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 5.4 16.9 2.4 1.9 3.8
United Kingdom 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.7
United States 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.0 3.9 2.9 1.6 2.6
a) Number of accidents as a percentage of the number of workers; ISIC classification 2: 3 =
Manufacturing, 5 = Construction, 6 = Trade, 10 = All other industries; Germany 1994; Greece:
non-fatal accident rate include fatal accidents; Ireland and Switzerland 1991; Netherlands 1989.
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Table 3 Estimation results non-fatal and fatal accident ratesa)






(1) ln(u) -0.32 (9.2) 0.988 -0.03 (0.5) 0.956 314 245
(2) ln(u) -0.31 (8.4) -0.03 (0.5)
∆ ln(u) -0.04 (0.7) 0.988 0.03 (0.3) 0.855 314 245
(3) ln(u) -0.31 (9.1) -0.02 (0.3)
∆ ln(e) 0.35 (0.9) 0.988 0.37 (0.8) 0.955 314 245
(4) ln(u) -0.31 (9.1) -0.04 (0.6)
ln(h) -0.23 (0.4) 0.987 -1.07 (1.4) 0.957 298 232
(5) ln(u) -0.30 (7.4) 0.08 (1.2)
s 0.88 (0.6) 0.990 5.44 (2.6) 0.960 276 204
a) All estimates contain country fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, country-specific time
trends and dummy variables for structural breaks (see Table A1 for an overview); u = unem-
ployment rate, e = employment, h = average annual number of hours of work, s = employment
share of manufacturing and construction; absolute t-values in parentheses; R
2
is corrected for
degrees of freedom (d.f.).
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(1) All -0.31 (9.5) 0.20 (4.2) 0.989 314 244
(2) 1976-1989 -0.19 (2.5) 0.17 (2.9) 0.990 157 108
1990-2001 -0.27 (4.6) 0.11 (1.7) 0.991 157 109
(3) EU only -0.32 (9.2) 0.20 (4.1) 0.989 265 201
(4) Industry-specific
Manufacturing -0.27 (7.6) 0.01 (0.2) 0.986 238 170
Construction -0.46 (5.3) -0.05 (0.2) 0.891 238 170
Other industries -0.41 (4.2) 0.17 (0.5) 0.981 238 170
All -0.33 (9.3) 0.12 (2.4) 0.990 238 170
(5) Institutions
Union density
High -0.25 (6.2) 0.12 (1.3) 0.970 111 87
Low -0.21 (7.0) 0.24 (4.7) 0.992 203 147
Unemployment benefits
High -0.15 (3.6) 0.20 (2.8) 0.957 148 120
Low -0.31 (9.5) 0.13 (1.8) 0.989 166 134
a) See footnote a Table 3 and the main text for explanatory information.
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Table 5 Comparing accident information of ILO and Eurostat; 2000a)
Non fatal Fatal
accidents (%) accidents (0.01%)
ILO Eurostat ILO Eurostat
Austria - 2.7 - 0.63
Belgium 2.6 2.5 0.19 0.29
Denmark 1.8 2.7 0.25 0.25
France 3.1 3.1 0.31 0.36
Germany 4.1 3.9 0.32 0.28
Greece 0.4 1.0 0.30 0.26
Italy 2.8 3.1 0.50 0.52
Spain 6.1 4.9 0.74 0.53
Sweden 0.9 1.2 0.14 0.14
United Kingdom 0.6 1.4 0.07 0.10
a) Greece 1999; Eurostat UK = Great Britain.
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Table 6 Estimation results non-fatal accident rates - Eurostat data; 1994-2002a)
ln(u) ln(fa) ln(h) R
2
d.f.
1. -0.34 (2.9) 0.11 (2.0) 1.25 (1.8) 0.985 60
2. -0.32 (2.7) 0.10 (1.8) - 0.985 61
3. -0.35 (2.9) - - 0.984 60
a) The estimates are based on information from 10 countries (90 observations; see main text);
See also footnote a Table 3 for explanatory information.
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